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Economists have long debated the relative effectiveness of markets and regulations in reaching 
socially desirable outcomes.  This empirical study of meat and poultry food safety regulation 
suggests that market mechanisms and flexible regulatory instruments, e.g. HACCP systems, have 
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The Impact of Market Mechanisms and HACCP Regulation on Food Safety Quality. 
 
Economists have long debated the relative effectiveness of market mechanisms and 
regulatory instruments in reaching socially desirable outcomes.  Antle (1996) and many other 
economists reluctantly argue that food safety regulation may be justified because buyers cannot 
directly evaluate pathogen levels before or after purchase and third parties cannot unambiguously 
certify quality because the costs of acquiring pathogen information is prohibitive.  In the absence 
of these traditional market mechanisms, large restaurant and grocery store chains have imposed 
their own food safety quality control programs on suppliers (Ollinger and Mueller, 2003).  These 
buyers have strong incentives to impose standards because they can spread the associated costs 
over millions of pounds of product sales and an outbreak of a foodborne illness attributed to 
them could cause them to lose their reputations, resulting in a catastrophic drop in profits. 
  Large buyers that are able to impose sophisticated quality control programs on suppliers 
account for only a small fraction of the meat and poultry market and even they may not know the 
pathogen levels of the meat products they sell.  Since buyers that do not require pathogen testing 
and some that do require it do not know the pathogen levels of the meat they buy, food safety 
quality remains an important public health concern of the U.S. government and has led the Food 
Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) of USDA to promulgate the Pathogen Reduction Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Point Regulation (PR/HACCP) rule in 1996.  This regulation mandates 
that all plants must establish and implement standard sanitation operating procedures (SSOPs) 
and a HACCP process control program, slaughter plants must adhere to generic E. coli standards, 
and slaughter and ground meat plants must comply with Salmonella standards.  The SSOPs are 
cleaning, sanitation, and process control tasks that plants must perform in order to be in   2
compliance with FSIS regulations.  Plants develop and implement their own HACCP programs 
but are subject to FSIS oversight.   
  The SSOPs mandated in the PR/HACCP rule reflected a continuation of a previous 
regulatory regime of process standards in which FSIS mandated and monitored specific tasks.  If 
plants completed the tasks, then they were in regulatory compliance.  Under the HACCP 
programs, FSIS took a different approach in that plants specified and implemented their own 
program.  FSIS, however, ensured that plants complied with their HACCP plans.  Antle (2001) 
classified SSOPs and HACCP programs as design standards because they require certain tasks to 
be performed.  Pointing out that HACCP programs are much more flexible than SSOPs since 
they are tailored to meet the unique circumstances of each plant, Coglianese and Lazer (2002) 
label HACCP programs as a management-based regulation. 
The generic E. coli and Salmonella standards mandated under PR/HACCP marked a 
significant departure from prior regulatory practices at FSIS.  Under these performance 
standards, plants must meet microbiological tolerances.  As long as the tests indicate that the 
plant is within tolerances, then it is considered to be in regulatory compliance.  Plants could use 
whatever approach they deemed necessary to meet the standard.  Antle (2001) and many other 
economists favor performance standards over design standards and management-based 
regulations because, due to their flexibility, they are considered to be a less costly way to comply 
with a regulation.  In a similar way, the flexibility offered by a management–based regulation 
should make this preferable to a stricter design standard that inhibits innovation. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impacts of large buyers, process regulatory 
standards, and management-based regulatory standards on food safety performance.  We use the 
number of positive Salmonella test samples as a share of all samples examined by FSIS as a   3
measure of food safety performance.   The analysis requires the use of unique datasets from FSIS 
and the Economic Research Service of USDA.  The FSIS datasets provide information about the 
plant-level number of meat and poultry samples testing positive for Salmonella, the number of 
samples tested for Salmonella, and plant performance of SSOP and HACCP tasks.  FSIS data 
also contains information about animals slaughtered and some production data.  The ERS data 
provides information on plant-level food safety technologies, whether plants have large 
customers that influence their production practices, and plant characteristics.  
 
Meat and Poultry Food Safety and the Regulatory Environment 
 
FSIS promulgated the final PR/HACCP rule on July 25, 1996.  The principal element of 
the PR/HACCP rule was the requirement to develop and implement HACCP process control 
programs for each FSIS-defined product produced by the plant.  HACCP programs are based on 
these seven criteria: (1) assessing all hazards, (2) finding all critical points, (3) setting critical 
limits for each critical control point (CCP), (4) developing procedures to monitor each CCP, (5) 
determining corrective actions, (6) implementing a recordkeeping system, and (7) establishing 
verification procedures (Unnevehr and Jensen,1996).    
There were other important components of the PR/HACCP rule.  The regulation required 
meat and poultry establishments to develop, implement, and take responsibility for performing 
SSOPs.  Second, it mandated that slaughter plants conduct generic E. coli microbial tests in order 
to verify that fecal contamination was under control.  Finally, in order to verify that their 
HACCP systems were controlling pathogens, the PR/HACCP rule established Salmonella 
performance standards for slaughter and ground meat and poultry plants.   4
PR/HACCP was phased in over several years.  All plants had to comply with the HACCP 
requirement by January 31, 2000.  Large plants were required to implement their programs by 
January 31, 1998, followed by small and very small plants over the next two years.  All plants 
had to have their SSOPs in place by January of 1997. 
 Pathogen testing marked a sharp departure from previous regulatory practices at FSIS 
because it required plants to meet standards without specifying how to reach the objective.  
Under the generic E. coli standard, plant testing requirements depended on production volume. 
Cattle slaughter plants, for example, have to take one sample per 300 carcasses, while broiler 
plants are required to take one sample per 22,000 birds.  Plants failing to meet the generic E. coli 
standard had to discover and correct the cause of the failure or face increased FSIS scrutiny of 
facilities, products, and plant compliance with their HACCP plan and SSOPs.  FSIS may also 
perform more product testing.  If plant performance is deemed unsatisfactory, FSIS can remove 
its inspectors. 
FSIS uses Salmonella tests as a measure of overall plant food safety process control, and 
can deem a failure to meet the standard as one of the bases for declaring a product to be 
adulterated.  Under this program, FSIS randomly selects plants for testing and then tests plants 
products (ground meat or carcasses) for Salmonella over a series of days.  A plant that exceeds 
the maximum allowed number of positive Salmonella samples must complete a second round of 
tests after it modifies its food safety process control program.  If the plant fails that round, then, 
it again modifies its process control program and undergoes another round of testing.   Failure to 
pass on the third attempt constitutes failure to maintain sanitary conditions and maintain an 
adequate HACCP plan and will cause FSIS to suspend inspection services.  The suspension   5
remains in effect until the plant submits a detailed action plan to correct the HACCP plan and 
outlines the other measures taken by the plant to reduce the prevalence of pathogens. 
  It has been rare for plants to fail Salmonella compliance testing.  Only about 100 out of 
the approximately 2,050 slaughter and grinding plants tested up to 1999 failed to pass the first 
test and only 22 of these 100 plants failed their first two tests.  Failure to comply after two tests 
would have led to increased enforcement review, but 19 of these plants passed the third test and 
continued production.  These 19 plants included 1 for ground turkey and 7 for ground beef, and 4 
hog slaughter, 6 broiler slaughter  and 2 cow and bull slaughter plants.  Supreme Beef and one 
other ground beef plant and one cow/bull slaughter plant failed three tests, and FSIS suspended 





We hypothesize that plant characteristics, food safety technology, performance of 
regulatory tasks, and the influence of large buyers affect Salmonella test performance.  Plant 
characteristics describe the size, scope, and complexity of a plant’s processing technology.  Food 
safety technologies include the equipment and procedures designed and adopted by plants for the 
purpose of controlling pathogens.  These technologies either kill pathogens directly by heat or 
chemical treatments or reduce the opportunity for product contamination through changes in 
operations or more intensive cleaning. 
Plants are required to comply with Standard Sanitation Operating Procedures (SSOPs), a 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) program, and maintain facilities according to 
FSIS specifications.  Plants write their own SSOP and HACCP plans and are expected to 
perform all the functions specified in their plans.  FSIS monitors plants and notes when plants   6
fail to comply.  Since the SSOPs and HACCP plans specify practices that are designed to control 
pathogens, deviations from the plan may result in a higher incidence of pathogens in meat and 
poultry products. 
Major buyers of a company’s products exert control over production practices in a variety 
of ways ranging from specifying technologies to refusing orders that may be of questionable 
quality.  We express food safety performance as function of plant characteristics (CHAR), food 
safety technology (FSTECH), regulatory compliance (REG), and major buyers on food safety 
performance (MARKET) in equation 1.  
 
PERF = (CHAR, FSTECH, REG, MARKET)    (1) 
where PERF is a number from zero to one indicating the share of samples testing positive for 




The dependent variable, PERF, is the number of positive test samples as a share of all test 
samples, making it an index bounded below by zero (plants with no samples testing positive for 
Salmonella) and bounded above by one (plants with all samples testing positive for Salmonella).  
In practice, many plants had no reported positive cases of Salmonella but no plant had only 
Salmonella positive cases, making the real distribution bounded from below but not from above. 
For purposes of the analysis we assume that PERF has a normal distribution centered 
around and truncated at zero, meaning that, if it were possible, some values would be less than 
zero.  Plants that fall in this truncated region are those plants that are particularly concerned   7
about their reputations for food safety and want to ensure that none of their products are 
contaminated. 
  Tobin (1958) was the first to consider regressions with censored dependent variables. He 
specified a dependent variable with a distribution centered at zero that contained a theoretically 
possible latent variable (y*).  Greene (1993) gives the following general formulation of the 
censored regression model, also known as the Tobit model: 
     i i i x y ε β + = '
*      (2) 
            y i  = 0  if yi 
* ≤ 0 
            y i  > 0  if yi
* >   0        
Applying equation 2 to equation 1 means that the distribution for yi
* is the percent 
samples testing positive for Salmonella.  A positive coefficient on an independent variable (a 
plant characteristics, technology, regulatory, or market variable in equation 1) means that the 
independent variable (xi ) encourages positive Salmonella test samples and a negative value 
means that xi decreases the likelihood of a positive Salmonella test sample. 
Marginal effects, as illustrated in equation 3, indicate by how much a change in an 
independent variable affects the likelihood of testing positive for Salmonella.   
β = ∂ ∂ i i i x x y E / ] | [
*       ( 3 )  
Typically, marginal effects, which show how marginal changes in the independent 
variables affect the dependent variable, can be obtained by taking a derivative of the regression 
equation, as shown in equation 3.  However, since Salmonella test performance occurs only in 
the positive portion of the distribution, an alternative specification, equation 6, is required.  As 
always, the sign and size of the coefficient indicates how much the independent variable affects 
the dependent variable.  Greene’s (1993) derivation of the marginal effects follows:    8
), ' )( / ' ( ] | [ i i i i i x x x y E σλ β σ β + Φ =     (4) 
where 
        ) / ' ( / ) / ' ( σ β σ β φ λ i i i x x Φ = ,    (5) 
and the marginal effect of the independent variables on yi is: 
) / ' ( / ] | [ σ β β i i i i x x x y E Φ = ∂ ∂ .     (6) 
Note, σ is the standard deviation, φ is the probability density function of the standard normal 
distribution, and Φ is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. 
  Below, we empirically represent our model.  
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where the variables have been defined above and  
PERFi (share of samples testing positive for Salmonella) = 0,    if  PERFi 
*
 ≤ 0, 
PERFi  (share of samples testing positive for Salmonella) > 0,     if  PERFi
*
  > 0. 
 
The mean of PERFi
*, a theoretically normally distributed dependent variable, is less than 
the mean of PERFi because PERFi cannot be less than zero.  The independent variables 
represented by CHAR are plant characteristics, such as plant size and whether the plant 
slaughters animals.  The impact of these variables on the share of samples testing positive for 
Salmonella depends on whether the characteristic adds to the complexity of plant operations or 
encourages food safety investments.  Greater complexity due to an increase in plant operating 
procedures makes the control of pathogens more costly due to higher management costs.  Greater 
economies of scale, on the other hand, may lower the cost of food safety investments.  Larger   9
size plants, for example, can reduce per unit food safety costs by spreading expenditures for new 
food safety equipment over a larger production volume.  
FSTECH represents five types of food safety technologies: sanitation procedures (not 
SSOPs), operating practices, product and environmental testing, equipment, and, for cattle 
slaughter plants, dehiding practices.  A negative relationship should exist if a technology is 
effective in reducing the number of positive Salmonella samples. 
REG is the influence of various FSIS regulatory instruments, e.g. SSOPs and HACCP 
plans.  Better performance of SSOPs or a plant‘s HACCP program should lead to fewer positive 
Salmonella test samples.  MARKET is a dummy variable for different types of market 
mechanisms k.  These mechanisms include relationships between plants and large buyers, like 
McDonalds, linkages between plants and export markets, and whether the plant produces a 
product under a brand name.  MARKET should negatively affect the number of positive 




  We defined the dependent variable, PERF, above.  There are several plant characteristics 
variables.  Large plants may be able to achieve economies of scale in food safety technology, 
making it easier for them to control pathogens, but they are also more complex than small plants, 
causing greater difficulty in controlling pathogens (Havelaar, Nauta, and Jansen, 2004).  As a 
measure of plant size, we use the log of pounds of plant output, Log (POUNDS).  We also 
control for multi-species plants because they are more complex than single-species plants, 
perhaps, making them more difficult to manage and less able to control pathogens.  Empirically,   10
we use a dummy variable indicating whether the plant slaughters more than one animal species, 
e.g. cattle and hogs, (MULTI-SPECIES).  Plants that slaughter animals and grind and cook meat 
or poultry are much more complex than single process plants; thus, we controlled for them.  We 
are uncertain of the signs because they may have offsetting incentives.  For example, a plant that 
both slaughters animals and grinds meat may be more cautious about controlling pathogens than 
a plant that simply slaughters animals because grinders may get feedback directly from 
consumers about food safety quality while a carcass producer may not.  To control for grinding 
operations in a slaughter plant, we define GROUND as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
plant grinds meat and zero otherwise. For plants that cook or further process meat or poultry, we 
define COOKED as dummy variable equal to one if the plant cooks or further processes meat or 
poultry and zero otherwise.  Finally, for ground beef plants we define SLAUGHTER as a 
dummy variable equal to one if the plant slaughters animals and zero otherwise. 
  The food safety technology variables for cattle slaughter are DEHIDE_TECH, an index 
value between zero and one describing the sophistication of plant dehiding technology, 
DEHIDE_KNIFE, a dummy variable indicating whether the plant sanitize knives or rotate knives 
after slaughtering each animal.  One of the food safety technology variables for broilers is 
dummy variable for whether the plant uses a modern eviscerator (EVISCERATOR).  One of the 
food safety technology variables for hogs is STEAM_VAC (a dummy variable equal one for 
plants that use steam vacuum machines for hogs).  For broiler, hogs, and ground beef an 
additional food safety technology variable is a dummy variable for plants with plant food safety 
operating procedures rated to be in the 90
th percentile on an index rating the intensity of food 
safety production practices (see the data section for further discussion).  A final food safety 
technology variable for poultry and hog slaughter is a dummy variable indicating whether a plant   11
removes the animal from feed prior to slaughter (NOFEED). 
  A regulatory variable for all plants is the number of inspected HACCP tasks not in 
compliance with HACCP plan requirements as a share of all HACCP tasks 
(HACCP_NOCOMPLY).  For all industries except cattle slaughter, another regulatory variable 
is the number of SSOP tasks not in compliance with the SSOP plan as a share of all SSOP tasks 
(SSOP_NOCOMPLY). 
The market influence variables for poultry and hog slaughter and ground beef 
(CUSTOMER_SPECS) is a dummy variable equal to one for plants subject to requirements from 
a domestic customers and zero otherwise while the market influence variable for cattle slaughter 
is one for plants that export and zero otherwise (EXPORT).  We included only one market 
mechanism variable in each regression.  The choice depended on which type of market would 
likely have the greatest influence on production practices.  Export markets may be more 
important for cattle slaughter plants than for the other plants because cattle carcasses are far 
removed from consumers and beef exports amount to about 10 percent of output.  Both hog 
slaughter and broiler plants have extensive further processing operations within their plants, thus, 
these plants and ground meat producers sell most of their products to domestic buyers that sell to 
consumers.  The large domestic buyers have substantial influence over their suppliers due to 




Data comes from the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) and Economic Research Service 
(ERS).  One of the FSIS datasets provides data on the two pieces of information needed to   12
compute the share of samples testing positive for Salmonella.  Among other data, this dataset 
includes the total number of test samples and the number of test samples found to be positive for 
Salmonella by FSIS personnel in randomly selected plants in the year 2000.  For cattle slaughter, 
we also used 2001 data because FSIS tested only 40 plants producing carcasses in 2000.   
Another of the FSIS datasets, also obtained in a personal communication, contains data on  
the number of SSOP and HACCP tasks out of compliance with the plant SSOP or HACCP plan.  
Each plant inspected by FSIS is required to have SSOP and HACCP plans that specify certain 
key points that should be monitored and maintained.  Since the number of SSOP and HACCP 
tasks varies by plant, we divided by the number of tasks not in compliance with SSOP and 
HACCP standards by total number of tasks to create variables for the shares of tasks out of 
compliance with SSOP and HACCP requirements. 
The FSIS data also contains the number of facility requirements established by FSIS that are 
out of compliance with FSIS specifications.  However, this variable was later dropped because it 
had little impact on Salmonella test performance. 
Some observers of FSIS inspection activities believe that variance exists in the way 
inspectors measure the performance of food safety tasks.  While this may be the case, we have 
no reason to believe that there is a systematic bias in these data.  Thus, it appears unlikely that 
random reporting differences will affect statistical results. 
The final FSIS dataset used in the analysis is the Enhanced Facilities Database (EFD) for 
2000.  This dataset contains detailed information on the numbers and types of animals 
slaughtered, SIC codes, pounds of meat or poultry produced, whether a plant produced meat or 
poultry, and categorical data on process types for each plant inspected by FSIS.   13
The Economic Research Service has a unique dataset containing information on plant 
characteristics, market mechanisms and food safety technologies.  The data were obtained in a 
survey containing approximately 40 questions dealing with food safety technology, 15 questions 
on aspects of the costs of the PR/HACCP regulation, various plant characteristics, and the types 
of markets plants serve.  The 40 food safety responses were used to create five types of food 
safety indices: food safety equipment, food safety tests, dehiding, sanitation, and food safety 
operating practices.  The index values more intensive food safety activities higher than less 
intensive ones.   Thus, a plant with the highest food safety equipment rating (one) would have all 
the types of equipment dealt with by the survey while a plant with a zero rating would have none 
of the equipment.  Plants with a partial number of pieces of equipment would have intermediate 
values.  See Ollinger et al, (2004) for a complete description of how the index was created and 




We ran separate regressions for the beef and hog carcasses, broilers, and ground beef 
products tested by FSIS.  We used only year 2000 data because the ERS and one FSIS dataset 
contained data only from that year.  The other FSIS datasets containing regulatory and 
performance information had multiple years.  We had to combine year 2000 data with 2001 data 
for cattle slaughter because we only had 40 observations in the year 2000. 
  Tables 1-3 contain the parameter estimates for marginal effects of plant characteristics, 
food safety technology, regulatory effort and market mechanisms of food safety performance, i.e. 
the share of meat or poultry samples testing positive for Salmonella.  All models were adjusted   14
for multiplicative heteroskedasticity with the following specification: σi 
2= σ
2exp (γ’Z) where Z 
is a vector of variables that affect the disturbance term, σi.  In our case, Z = Log of OUTPUT and 
γ = [ln σ
2, β].  A likelihood test shows that the heteroskedastic correction is significant for each 
model.  
Regression results show that the joint likelihood of the model (equation 7) is significant 
in each case.  Plant size is significant and positive in hog slaughter and ground beef and 
significant and negative for cattle slaughter.  These differences are likely due to the range of food 
safety technologies available for different types of processing operations.  Cattle slaughter plants 
have a variety of technologies that control pathogens either through heat or chemical solutions.  
These technologies become less costly per unit of output as plant size increases.  Ground beef 
plants, on the other hand, have few food safety technologies other than sanitation and operating 
procedures to control pathogens.  Since it is likely that smaller economies of scale occur in 
sanitation and operating procedures than in equipment, it may be that economies of scale enable 
large cattle slaughter to produce carcasses with lower pathogen counts than their smaller 
slaughter plant counterparts but such economies of scale do not exist in ground beef.  
Results show that multi-species poultry and hog slaughter and ground beef plants are 
more likely to have meat or poultry samples test positive for Salmonella, perhaps because 
Salmonella grow readily and greater complexity makes food safety more difficult to control.  
Cattle slaughter plants that grind meat and ground beef plants that slaughter animals have a 
lower likelihood of having samples test positive for Salmonella, perhaps, because cattle slaughter 
plants with grinding operations take extra precautions to avoid pathogen contamination while 
poultry slaughter plants do not. 
Why might cattle slaughter plants be more cautious about contaminating ground meat   15
than poultry slaughter plants?  Ground beef is used to make hamburgers and a wide range of 
other products that may be eaten without reaching the temperature needed to kill pathogens, 
making contaminated ground beef a potential source for severe gastrointestinal problems and a 
cause for numerous product recalls that have cost the industry millions of dollars.  Ground 
poultry, on the other hand, is rarely eaten partially cooked and rarely recalled. 
The other plant characteristic, whether the plant produces cooked products, was not 
significant.  There were also other characteristics that we considered, including whether a cattle 
slaughter plant butchered cows and bulls, but they were not significant and were not included in 
our model.   
Numerous food safety technology variables were examined, but only a few were 
significant or nearly significant.  Even though cattle slaughter has a wide array of types of food 
safety equipment, none of them significantly affected positive Salmonella test results and only 
dehiding technology had much of an impact.  Even within dehiding, only knife sanitation and, to 
a lesser extent, hand and glove sanitation (not shown) had a measurable impact on Salmonella.  
Poultry slaughter plants using an eviscerator that completely removes the viscera from the bird 
and hog slaughter plants employing steam vacuum machines to control pathogens after slaughter 
had fewer samples testing positive for Salmonella. 
Food safety technology indexes were created for food safety equipment, testing, plant 
operations, dehiding (cattle slaughter only), sanitation, and overall (see data section for 
discussion).  Only hog slaughter and ground beef plants with a food safety operating procedures 
index value in the 90
th percentile had significantly fewer samples testing positive for Salmonella.  
The plant operations index includes responses to questions dealing with how the plant handles 
acceptable product that needs to be reworked, employees training, product refrigeration, and   16
others.  Results also show that a higher index value for dehiding technology reduced the number 
of samples testing positive for Salmonella.  The dehiding index includes responses to questions 
dealing with knife and glove sanitation, whether air vacuums are used at the kill and hide 
removal station, etc. 
Results show that equipment, testing, and sanitation technologies play little role in 
enhancing food safety and that plants must perform multiple operating tasks to benefit from 
improved food safety.  Judging from these results, it appears that technology plays a small role in 
controlling Salmonella.  Why might this be the case?  It appears that plants are choosing food 
safety technologies that enable them reach their food safety goals.  Plants that use fewer new 
technologies are likely the ones that need them the least and plants that use more have the 
greatest difficulty in controlling pathogens (Haavalar, Nauta, and Jansen).  Thus, plants with a 
more technologically sophisticated facility likely have a greater need for the technology. 
Poultry and hog plants often remove animals from feed prior to slaughter in order to 
reduce fecal matter.  Results show that broiler plants removing animals from feed had fewer 
samples testing positive for Salmonella while hog plants had more samples testing positive. 
The PR/HACCP rule contains three types of standards: process standards in which the 
regulating agency (FSIS) specifies tasks that must be performed to be in compliance, 
management based regulations (HACCP plans) that are established by the plant in consultation 
with the regulating agency (FSIS), and performance standards in which the regulating agency 
(FSIS) specifies a food safety performance target (a maximum number of samples testing 
positive for Salmonella).  Regulators establish process standards and require management-based 
regulations in order to improve plant regulatory performance (reduce pathogens in plants).  Thus, 
both the process and management-based regulations should reduce the number of samples testing   17
positive for Salmonella. 
Results show that as the share of HACCP tasks not in compliance with management 
plans rise, the number of samples testing positive for Salmonella also rises in each of the 
industries and significantly so in broilers and cattle slaughter.  Tables 1-3 also show that the 
number of samples testing positive for Salmonella rises as the share of tasks not in compliance 
with SSOPs rises in ground beef and hog slaughter.  A significant relationship exists in ground 
beef.  The tables also show that a negative relationship exists between SSOPs and the number of 
samples testing positive for Salmonella in poultry and cattle slaughter.  It appears that this is due 
to collinearity since the relationship becomes positive if the variable for HACCP noncompliance 
is removed.  Overall, the results suggest that both process-based and management-based 
regulations improve food safety performance. 
Notice the coefficients on the share of HACCP tasks not in compliance with regulations 
is larger than the coefficients on the share of SSOP task not in compliance in all cases, even 
ground beef.   These findings suggest that the management-based regulatory approach (HACCP 
plans) have a greater impact on food safety performance than the regulator-based process 
standard (SSOPs).  A 10 percent decrease in noncompliant HACCP tasks would reduce positive 
Salmonella test samples by about 5 percent in all industries except cattle slaughter, in which case 
the reduction would be about 3 percent.  By contrast, the changes in noncompliant SSOP tasks 
varies from a decrease of about 4 percent in ground beef to an increase of about 1 percent in 
cattle slaughter. 
Market mechanisms (customer specifications and export markets) negatively affect the 
share of samples testing positive for Salmonella in all industries except ground beef, which has a 
very small positive relationship.  The relationship is significant and negative in broilers and   18
cattle slaughter.  The impact of market mechanisms in broilers is about a 6 percent reduction in 
positive Salmonella test samples and in cattle slaughter it is about 1 percent.  For hog carcasses, 
there is about a 3 percent reduction.  These results suggest that private markets play a vital role 




  This paper examined the impact of plant characteristics, food safety technology, two 
types of regulations, and market mechanisms on food safety performance, as measured by the 
number of product samples testing positive for Salmonella in an FSIS testing program.  Plant 
characteristics – plant size, variety of species of animals slaughtered in the plant, and whether 
slaughter plants had grinding operations – had an important impact on Salmonella testing results.  
Specific food safety technologies, however, provided little advantage to their users.  We attribute 
this finding to the incentives of firms to obtain more sophisticated technologies or employ more 
rigorous standards – both of which are costly.  We suggest that plants with the most sophisticated 
technologies and techniques are the ones that most need them to avoid product contamination.  
Plants with less need for sophisticated technologies perform have no need to obtain them and so 
they do not. 
  The most important finding in the paper is the linkage between the PR/HACCP process 
standard (SSOPs) and the PR/HACCP managed regulatory approach (HACCP plans) to the 
PR/HACCP performance standard (Salmonella results).  We found that both process and 
management-based regulations enhanced food safety performance.  The more flexible 
management-based HACCP plans, which are developed by the plants and includes tasks that are   19
monitored by FSIS, had the greatest impact in reducing Salmonella levels.  We cannot say 
whether process or management-based regulations are superior because the two approaches 
covered different types of tasks that provide different opportunities for controlling pathogens.  
However, we can say that both regulations play an important role in controlling pathogens. 
  Another important result of this empirical research is the finding that market mechanisms 
reduce the likelihood of product contamination.  This should not be too surprising.  Large buyers, 
such as fast food restaurants, demand high food safety quality because they could lose their 
reputation for serving wholesome food if they serve food with low food safety quality.  These 
and the other findings lead to overall conclusion that market mechanisms and flexible regulations 
have exerted powerful forces in improved pathogen control over meat and poultry.  
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Table 1:  Marginal Effects of Plant and Food Safety Technology, Customer Specifications, and 
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Table 2:  Marginal Effects of Plant and Food Safety Technology, Customer Specifications, and 
Food Safety Effort on Salmonella Performance in Broilers and Hog Slaughter 
 
 ---------Broilers--------- -------------Hogs------------ 





















MULTI-SPECIES   0.096
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Table 3:  Marginal Effects of Plant and Food Safety Technology, Customer Specifications, and 
Food Safety Effort on Salmonella Performance in Ground Beef 
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